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ROLE OF FINANCIAL SECTOR FDI IN REGIONAL IMBALANCES  






Foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign ownership and the transformation of the 
financial sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have received considerable attention 
during the transition, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.2 Much less 
attention has been devoted to the post-transition period and the impact of the crisis, 
which has become the most serious challenge to transition models in the CEE banking 
sectors.  
This research argues that the FDI development path in the CEE followed the pattern 
of a dependent market economy (DME) type of capitalism.3 It shows that there was a 
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Role of Financial Sector FDI in the CEE 
FDI inflows have increased in the CEE in the past 20 years to become the most common 
type of capital flow. FDI inflow into CEE economies has been a vital factor in the first 
stage of privatisation, and FDI became the predominant type of incoming capital 
investment in the first stage of the economic transition. This process not only facilitated 
the restructuring of the formerly centrally planned economies but privatization as well. 
The banking and insurance sector became the primary target of strategic foreign 
investors. Similar to global processes, the entry of foreign banks was geographically or 
regionally concentrated, and the main investor banks came from traditional or strong 
economies and trading partners (mainly from eurozone countries).  
 Foreign financial inflows have resulted in dramatic changes of ownership 
structures. In 1994, in the wake of the early transition crises, an overwhelming majority of 
financial intermediaries in the post-communist countries were still publicly owned. By 
contrast, in 2007, more than a decade later, private foreign ownership already accounted 
for about 80% of financial intermediaries’ assets in the CEE region. These figures are 
especially striking when compared to the just under a quarter of foreign-owned banking 
assets across the European Union (EU), 15.5% in the euro area, and 50% outside the OECD.4 
This share of foreign banks was relatively large compared, for example, to the level of 
economic development in the region. 
The results show that FDI has been substantial in the financial services sector of the 
Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and in Slovenia. This 
analysis covers all sectors, but the focus is on banking. In the Visegrad countries, though 
with different timing, FDI inflow in the analysed sector had been substantial, resulting in a 
dominant share of foreign capital (predominantly from traditional partner countries from 
Western Europe) and a large share of the sector in the stock of FDI already in the pre-
crisis era. On the other hand, in Slovenia the role of foreign investors is comparatively 
much lower, resulting in a predominantly domestically owned financial services sector. 
There is only one regional player, the Hungarian OTP bank.5  
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Asymmetric Power Relations and Regional Imbalances in the Dual-Banking Systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe  
 
Foreign banks (understandably) followed commercial market principles rather than 
economic development and were never geared for or ‘diverted’ by regulatory elements 
towards addressing the development needs of the host CEE. Rather, they were always 
aimed at redressing the declining profitability of financial institutions operating in the 
already financialised economies of Western Europe. As a result, foreign financiers 
emerged as a powerful rentier class in Central Europe, able to extract rent incomes far in 
excess of their profits in the West.6 This led not only to an unprecedented transfer of 
property rights from local society to foreign investors but also to increased imbalances in 
the financial sector through indebtedness and risk. 
If we try to place the CEE in the comparative typologies of capitalism following 
Nölke and Vliegenthart’s7 argument, the primary source of investment in the CEE is 
foreign direct investment, not the stock market as in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) or 
domestic credit as in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Although FDI does play a 
role in the CME and LME models, the degree of external dependency is much more 
extreme in the CEE. As DMEs are heavy importers of capital, the ratio of inward and 
outward FDI stock is much higher than in the old EU Member States due to the low level 
of capital exports (OFDI) from these countries.8 
Due to the extremely huge volumes of FDI, foreign banks prefer to hierarchically 
control local subsidiaries from their headquarters.9 This is an alternative mode of finance 
and governance rather than to accept financing by international capital markets and 
outsider control by dispersed shareholders in LME, or to accept financing by domestic 
bank lending as well as retained earnings and insider control by networks of concentrated 
shareholders in CME. The hierarchy between the headquarters of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and local subsidiaries replaces markets (LME) and associations (CME) 
as a typical coordination mechanism within these economies.10  
Financial TNCs in international financial centres have a massive concentration of 
resources that allow them to maximise the benefits of information and connectivity with 
other centres and generate asymmetric power relations executed through their affiliates. 
These power relations mediate strong controlling functions and assess the concentration 
of controlling functions over the CEE within the international financial centre network, 
from where these investments are controlled.  
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The research evaluates the inter-linkages within the international financial centre 
networks through  the geographical distribution of subsidiaries and their parent bank 
locations. It explores the international financial centre function of Budapest, Warsaw and 
Prague in assessing the preconditions of international financial centre formation.  
Asymmetric power relations are outcomes of previous FDI transactions and are created 
between the home and host countries through parent-subsidiary networks of big 
financial investors.11 In the financial sector, the eastward market expansion has mainly 
been to the benefit of West European banks and insurance companies, which control the 
financial sector in Eastern Europe. They set up their subsidiary networks in parallel in the 
CEE and it is no coincidence that none of the new Member States hosts a financial centre 
with full-fledged international functions, partially because Central and Eastern European 
financial centres are subordinated by Western international financial centres.  
As Central and Eastern European countries are largely dependent on foreign 
investors in finance, explicit attention is directed at determining which CEE financial 
centres attract multinational financial firms, and it is empirically assessed from which 
international financial centres these investments are controlled.12 The banking sector in 
the CEE is predominantly commanded from the financial hubs of the neighbouring ‘old’ 
EU Member States. Vienna, Stockholm and Athens, among others, became gateways to 
the East and host the headquarters of large investors in the CEE, Baltics and Southeastern 
Europe, respectively. The largest concentration of parent-subsidiary connections forms 
bridgehead centres (Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest) in the CEE.13 
The purpose of the future research is to examine the transformation and post-crisis 
restructuring of the financial/banking sector in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, not only in the context of the DME approach but also as part of an attempt to 
develop and verify the existence of a ‘dual financial/banking system’ model.14 FDI 
generates typical core-periphery disparities, not only inside the old EU member countries 
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but also between old and new Member States, which suffer from a ‘de-nationalised dual-
banking system’. That model, consisting of large foreign banks and small local/indigenous 
banks, displays strong dependence on foreign banks and their resources (external 
liabilities vs. local savings). There is a strong impact of foreign banks on credit creation, 
cross-border and domestic financial transfers, and financial stability, particularly during a 
crisis.15 The general aim is to study the role of the ‘dual-banking system’ in the creation of 
regional imbalances and in the transmission of adverse shocks in the CEE. 
The dependency approach related to financial sector FDI is contrasted by the 
traditional ‘modernization theory’, which highlights the key role of foreign banks in 
institutional development, stability and the increase of financial depth of the banking 
sectors.16 This latter literature highlights that financial sector FDI increased the host 
country integration into the global economy through improved general and allocative 
efficiency and technology transfers. Financial sector FDI can also strengthen the 
institutional development in the host country through improved regulation and 
supervision, therefore foreign bank entry into emerging markets reduces the incidence of 
crisis and contagion, particularly when foreign banks have a lstronger subsidiary 
presence.17  
Current FDI literature18 focusing on the impact of foreign bank presence on credit 
creation and financial stability during a crisis confronts the once dominant approach of 
the ‘supporting effect’ of foreign banks.19 .Rajan20 found that non-industrial countries that 
relied more on foreign finance have not grown faster in the long run and typically have 
grown slowly. 
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The net assets position and current account balance is more positively correlated with growth. This is due 
to the limited ability to absorb foreign capital in developing countries. There is now evidence that emerging 
countries grow fast and run large current account deficits. This was the case in much of the CEE, where 
inflow of foreign capital was accompanied by large current account deficits, which had an effect on the 
exchange rate, resulting in a decrease in competitiveness 
Cetorelli and Goldberg21 argue that the adverse liquidity shocks that occurred in the 
developed countries in 2008 and 2009 have reduced lending in local markets through 
contractions in cross-border lending to banks and through contractions in parent banks’ 
support of foreign subsidiaries as a result of a shortage of liquidity in developed 
countries, which spread to the CEE.22  
Claessens and van Horen23 argue that foreign bank presence in developing countries 
is negatively related with domestic credit creation.24 During the global crisis, foreign 
banks reduced credit more than domestic banks, except when they dominated the host 
banking systems. The authors also argue that the impact of foreign banks on financial 
sector development and financial stability depend importantly on the host country, home 
country and bank characteristics. In the case of the CEE, the presence of foreign banks 
highlighted the cross-border risks and contagion as they generally reduced domestic 
credit temporarily in 2009 to a greater extent than did domestic banks (for example, 
Hungarian cooperative banks). The research also examines the stages and direction of 
transmission of these shocks and potential contagion. However, the region is not 
homogeneous in all these respects and comparisons across countries are needed. 
Concerning the crisis years, the findings are more consistent with the findings of the 
current literature,25 which focus on the impact of foreign bank presence during the 
current crisis. Foreign banks (parent to subsidiary) played a significant role in the 
transmission of contagion to emerging market economies during the current crisis. Due 
to cross-border financial exposures, the related risks of contagion channelled between 
West European and CEE international financial centres are resulting in an asymmetric shift 
in capital flows and contributing to further regional polarisation. 
The crisis has modified the incentives for EU countries that are not part of the 
EMU—such as many of the CEE countries—to access the eurozone. Foreign currency 
indebtedness26 channelled through the interlinkages of West European parent banks and 
their local subsidiaries has an implication for internal and external imbalances within the 
EU banking system.27 The ‘dual-banking systems’ in the CEE are more prone to transmit 
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adverse shocks across borders and serve as a propagation channel for potential regional 
shocks that might be transmitted throughout the CEE.  
In the run-up to the global crisis, the countries in Central Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe attracted large capital inflows and some of them built up large external 
imbalances. Previous studies on external imbalance in the CEE show the positive and 
significant impact of foreign capital on the investment rate in the CEE and on growth. 
However, the crisis years caused not only a deterioration of capital inflows but also a 
deterioration of domestic and foreign demand, which led to a deep economic depression 
in much of the region. Śliwiński28 argues that there is no positive correlation between 
increased domestic savings and domestic investment in crisis-hit countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary) and thus this lack of correlation follows the expectation set by the 
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Increased domestic savings (dramatic fall in consumption) were 
spent for debt repayment rather than investment and consumption. This was the case in 
some countries that experienced negative or zero growth in 2008 and 2009 (Latvia, 
Hungary, Romania). In Hungary, accumulated imbalances required huge external 
adjustment as all indebted economic players were deleveraging. In 2012, the global 
banking sector reduced its external position in Hungary by about $18 bn, or 14.2% of 
Hungarian GDP compared to Spain, with 14.3% of GDP. In some countries in the region, 
funding availability and cost remain a constraint for CEE banking, and the accelerated 
deleveraging in the banking system led to a more severe decline in bank lending in Baltic 
states and in Hungary than the eurozone average (measured by loans to the nonfinancial 
corporate sector). 
Summing up, I argue that the role of foreign savings in promoting economic growth 
in the CEE-10 countries was undoubted in the short run and in a growth environment but 
challenged in the long run, particularly during crisis times. Since the outbreak of the crisis, 
not only have FDI inflows decreased but also the role of foreign capital in promoting 
economic growth has been revised.  
 
Research Outlook 
The research aim is on one hand to develop and verify the existence of the ‘dual-
financial/banking system’ model29 in the analysed countries in terms of weak or missing 
local banking structures and strong dependence on foreign banks and their resources 
(external liabilities vs. local savings). On the other hand, it examines how foreign 
ownership and the related evolution of a dual financial and banking system impacted the 
economies in question during the crisis years in terms of financial stability. The research 
identifies to what extent the banking system integration of the CEE contributed to the 
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regional imbalances within the European Union and the eurozone. The research relies on 
various indicators of the financial services and banking sectors of the analysed countries 
(macro data) and on information from the balance sheets of dominant banks (microdata). 
It compares the pre- and post-crisis periods.  The paper argues that the role of foreign 
savings in promoting economic growth in the CEE-10 countries was undoubted in the 
short run and in a growth environment but this is rather not true in the long run and in 
crisis times. Financialised growth escalated in the years up to 2008 in those countries that 
lacked domestic deposit bases. This, was a transient phase that ended with the world 
financial crisis, leaving a number of countries, and among them the analysed ones, with 
uncertain futures. 
 
 
 
 
